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Calderon v. Coleman
119 S. Ct. 500 (1998)
L Facts
On September 5, 1979, Shirley Hill's ("Hill") ex-husband drove her
from her home in San Francisco to nearby Daly City where she was to
attend real estate classes.' Hill planned to return by bus, and, while en route
to Daly City, they discussed the route she would take home.2 Hill was seen
in classes from noon to 3:00 or 3:15 p.m., and was last seen at 3:30 at the
Westlake Shopping Center in Daly City.' Her body was found the after-
noon of September 6, 1979, in a bungalow adjoining the Mission High
School football field.4 The field was several miles from the Westlake Shop-
ping Center, but only a few blocks from a bus transfer stop which Hill
would have used on her way home from Daly City.'
After a trial in a California state court, a jury convicted Russell
Coleman ("Coleman") of the rape, sodomy, and murder of Shirley Hill.6
The jury's findings as to rape and sodomy made Coleman eligible for the
death penalty. During the penalty phase of the bifurcated proceeding, the
trial judge gave the jury what is known as a "Bripgs instruction." The Briggs
instruction, then required under California law, was intended to inform the
jury of the governor's power to commute a sentence of life without the
possibility of parole.9 After giving the standard Briggs instruction, the trial





6. Calderon v. Coleman, 119 S. Ct. 500, 501 (1998).
7. Id.
8. The Briggs instruction, although still codified under section 190.3 of the California
Penal Code, was declared unconstitutional under the state constitution in California v.
Ramos, 689 P.2d 430 (Cal. 1984). See CAL. PENAL CODE S 190.3 (West 1998).
9. The full text of the court's instruction was as follows:
You are instructed that under the State Constitution, a Governor is empowered
to grant a reprieve pardon or commutation of a sentence following conviction
of the crime. Under this power, a Governor may in the future commute or
modify a sentence of life imrisonment without the possibility of parole to a
lesser sentence that would icude the possibility of parole. So that you will have
no misunderstandings relating to a sentence of life without possibility of parole,
you have been informed generally as to the Governor's commutation modifica-
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judge, for reasons which are unclear, then instructed the jury that it was not
to consider the governor's commutation power in reaching its verdict. 0
After exhausting direct appeals, Coleman petitioned the federal district
court for a writ of habeas corpus. After recognizing that the Briggs instruc-
tion was not facially unconstitutional," the district court granted the writ
on the ground that the instruction given in Coleman's case was inaccurate
as applied because it failed to mention a limitation on the governor's power
to commute the sentence. 2 This failure, the court found, violated the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by "g[iving] the jury inaccurate infor-
mation and potentialy divert[ing] its attention from the mitigation evidence
presented"'3 and, in the context of the prosecutor's arguments for future
dangerousness, "prevent[ing] the jury from giving due effect to Coleman's
mitigating evidence." 4 Although the court did not expressly consider the
effect of the instruction requiring the jury not to consider commutation, it
noted that the Ninth Circuit had held in a similar case, Hamilton v.
Vasquez,"5 "that the trial court did not cure the error by instructing the jury
not to consider commutation."' 6
In affirming the district court, the Ninth Circuit-in what the United
States Supreme Court later termed a "sweeping pronounce-
ment"'7 -concluded that "[a] commutation instruction is unconstitutional
when it is inaccurate."" The court of appeals then turned to the state's
tion power. You are now instructed, however, that the matter of a Governor's
commutation power is not to be considered by you in determining the punish-
ment for this aefendant. You may not speculate as to if or when a Governor
would commute the sentence to a lesser one which includes the possibility of
parole. I instruct you again that you are to consider only those aggravating and
initigating factors which I have alieady read to you in determining which putnish-
met shall be imposed on this defendant.
Coleman, 119 S. Ct. at 501 (citing Respondent's Opposition to Motion to Amend Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus in No. C89-1906 (N.D. Cal.), p. 7, Record, Doc. No. 267, quoting
Tr. 1059-1060).
10. Id at 501.
11. Id at 502 (citing No. C89-1906 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 28, 1997), App. to Pet. for Cert.
A-146, A-151 (citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983) (upholding Briggi Instruction
under federal constitution)).
12. Id. Under the state constitution, the governor may commute the sentence of a
prisoner who, like Coleman, is a twice-convicted felon only with the approval of four
California Supreme Court justices. CAL. CONST., art. 5, § 8.
13. Coleman, 119 S. Ct. at 502 (citing No. C89-1906 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 28, 1997), App.
to Pet. for Cert. A-151).
14. Id (citing No. C89-1906 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 28, 1997), App. to Pet. for Cert. A-149).
15. 17 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 1994).
16. Coleman, 119 S. Ct. at 502 (citing No. C89-1906 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 28, 1997), App.
to Pet. for Cert. A-148).
17. Id
18. Id (quoting Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1118 (9th Cir. 1998)).
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argument that, even if the instruction were unconstitutional, it "did not
have a 'substantial and injurious effect or influence' on the jury's sentence
of death" 9 under Brecht v. Abrahamson20 and was therefore harrnless.2' The
court of appeals did not, however, expressly address the Brecht test:
To decide this question, we look to Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370
(1990). When the inaccuracy undermines the jury's understanding of
sentencing options, 'there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has
applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consider-
ation of constitutionally relevant evidence.' Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380. We
conclude the district court did not err in holding that Coleman was
denied due grocess by the state trial court's inaccurate commutation
instruction.
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Ninth Circuit's
application of Boyde was in fact a harmless error analysis as required under
Brecht.
II. Holding
The Supreme Court found that the Ninth Circuit failed to apply
harmless error analysis and therefore remanded the case to the district court
for a finding on that issue.2"
Il. Analysis lApplication in Virginia
The Supreme Court found that the Boyde test was not a harmless error
test, but rather a test for determining "whether constitutional error occurred
when the jury was given an ambiguous instruction that it might have
interpreted to prevent consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence."24
In such cases, constitutional error exists only if "there is a reasonable
likelihood" that the jury so interpreted the instruction." The Court noted
that although the Brecht and Boyde tests are similar in that they both further
the public policy "against retrials years after the first trial where the claimed
error amounts to no more than speculation," 26 the Boyde analysis does not
inquire into whether, in the whole context of the particular case, the result
19. Id. (quoting Coleman, 150 F.3d at 1118).
20. 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993).
21. Coleman, 119 S. Ct. at 502 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)).
22. Coleman, 150 F.3d at 1119 (9th Cir. 1998) (parallel citations and other citations
omitted).
23. Coleman, 119 S. Ct. at 503-04.
24. Id at 503 (citing Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377, 380 (1990)).
25. Id. (citing Boyde, 494 U.S. at 377).
26. Id. (quoting Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380).
1999]
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of the error was a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury's
verdict."
Defense counsel in Virginia should be aware that there is no Virginia
counterpart to the Briggs instruction. Were the Commonwealth to make a
motion requesting that the jury be instructed regarding the governor's
power to commute a death sentence, the issue should be litigated under the
Virginia Constitution 2' and under Virginia case law. For example, pre-
Simmons 9 cases have held that information regarding parole eligibility is not
evidence properly before the jury,3" and the same rule ought to apply to the
governor's power to commute a life sentence. In addition, defense counsel
may request an evidentiary hearing at which it may be demonstrated that
any power to commute a sentence is in fact a "paper power," that is, one
which is virtually never exercised.
Douglas R. Banghart
27. Id. at 504.
28. A claim under the United States Constitution would fail, of course, because the
United States Supreme Court has found the Briggs instruction to be constitutional. See
California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
29. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (holding when future dangerous-
ness is at issue, a capital defendant has due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment to
provide evidence indicating his ineligibility for parole).
30. See Mueller v. Commonwealth, 422 S.E.2d 380, 394-95 (Va. 1992).
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